James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence : breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’ by McCrisken, Trevor & Moran, Christopher R.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
McCrisken, Trevor and Moran, Christopher R. (2018) James Bond, Ian Fleming and 
intelligence : breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’. Intelligence 
and National Security . pp. 1-18.doi:10.1080/02684527.2018.1468648  
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/102247             
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence 
and National Security on 09/05/2018 available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1468648 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
1	
	
JAMES BOND, IAN FLEMING, AND INTELLIGENCE: BREAKING 
DOWN THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE ‘REAL’ AND THE 
‘IMAGINED’* 
 
Trevor McCrisken and Christopher Moran 
 
Submitted for publication to:  
Intelligence and National Security – Published on-line May 9, 2018  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2018.1468648 
 
In the discipline of Politics and International Studies, the notion that James Bond 
should be taken seriously is often likely to be encountered with disapproving 
stares, raised eyebrows or pitiful headshaking. At least, that is our experience; at a 
recent meeting, a senior colleague audibly harrumphed at the idea that we were 
writing on the subject of 007. With the shaken martinis, the weaponised cars, the 
larger-than-life evil masterminds and their pet sharks, third nipples and metallic 
hands, Bond is still considered by some academics as too lightweight and trivial to 
be afforded serious engagement. The secondary literature in the 1980s and 1990s 
did not help since it was dominated by contributions from ‘Bondologists’ with un-
academic titles like The James Bond Bedside Companion; Dressed to Kill: James Bond – The 
Suited Hero; and Kiss Kiss Bang Bang.1 In interviews, even Bond’s creator Ian Fleming 
had described his fictional spy as nothing more than cheap entertainment for the 
masses, specifically ‘warm-blooded heterosexuals in railway trains, airplanes or 
beds’.2 Rejecting that there was any deep intellectual agenda behind the books, he 
claimed that he only invented Bond on the eve of his wedding to offset the 
‘horror’ of settling down at the age of 43. ‘James Bond is the author’s pillow 
fantasy’, he remarked in July 1963, ‘And fantasy isn’t real life by definition. It’s very 
much the Walter Mitty Syndrome – the feverish dreams of the author of what he 
might have been’.3  
Further reinforcing the view that scholars of Politics and International 
Studies should be wary of the subject is the sensitive issue of Bond’s lack of 
political correctness. At the heart of Bond is an antiquated, chauvinistic, idea of 
patriotism that holds Britain to be the greatest moral authority on earth; regards 
‘Johnny Foreigner’ with disdain; and hankers for that now dirtiest of words, 
‘empire’.4 There are moments in the series that are shamelessly racist: from the 
cringeworthy scene in Dr No (1962) where Sean Connery’s Bond orders the 
Jamaican boatman Quarrel to ‘fetch my shoes’, which is carried out without 
hesitation or expectation of gratitude, to the bigoted antics of tobacco-spitting, 
																																								 																				
*	Oral presentations of this article were given at Edinburgh Spy Week, in April 2016, and the American 
University in Dubai in January 2017. We are grateful to the organisers of these events for providing us 
with the opportunity to speak to such discerning audiences. We are also grateful to the journal’s editor 
and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.	
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small town Louisiana sheriff J.W. Pepper in The Man With the Golden Gun (1974) 
who jokes about ‘pointy-heads’. Equally objectionable is the series’ often degrading 
depiction of women. Existing in a world where masculine domination is the natural 
order of things, Bond ‘girls’ are typically damsels-in-distress, used for sex before 
being cast off, and objectified with tight outfits, languid poses and innuendo-laden 
names. Fleming’s hero was also shockingly homophobic. In the novel Goldfinger 
(1959), homosexuals are described as a ‘herd of unhappy sexual misfits’, 
‘pansies…confused, not knowing what they are’. One of these ‘misfits’ – Pussy 
Galore, a trapeze artist turned leader of an all-lesbian gang of cat burglars – even 
has her sexual orientation changed by Bond’s prowess, described as his ‘Tender 
Loving Care treatment’.5 As a result of the prevalence of such attitudes toward 
race, gender and sexuality, to study Bond as a site for exploring the meaning and 
significance of intelligence has been regarded as problematic on moral and 
ideological grounds.  
As scholars of the politics of intelligence, however, it is impossible to escape 
Bond. In the classroom, when asked about their motivation for studying 
intelligence, our students will frequently reply that they want to know if spying is 
‘like Bond’. When a new film is released, we often find ourselves giving media 
interviews answering questions like ‘do real spies have a licence to kill?’ It is 
noticeable that many academic publications on intelligence have Bond-inspired 
titles, probably at the request of publishers to boost sales. For example, the US 
version of Christopher Andrew’s landmark 1985 study of the British intelligence 
community was named Her Majesty’s Secret Service.6 In 2011, the respected espionage 
authority Michael Smith produced a history of the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS/MI6) called Six: The Real James Bonds.7 Another eminent writer on intelligence, 
Robert Dover, named one of his essays ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’.8 While 
researching in intelligence archives, we have been struck by the volume of Bond-
related material (of which more later.) Try as we might, staying clear has been no 
easy task. Accordingly, we concluded it was time to say something meaningful 
about the subject. 
In recent years, the tide has been turning in terms of scholarly acceptance of 
cultural products as legitimate sources for study and research in history, politics, 
international relations and more recently intelligence, as well as in cultural studies 
and cultural history. Serious scholarship on how film and literature represent 
historical and political subjects has grown considerably and much of that work 
argues, as we do here, that cultural outputs contribute significantly to the 
production and reproduction of narratives about, and within, the political world – 
that they are co-constitutive with politics in constructing our perceptions of 
‘reality’.9 As Debbie Lisle has contended, film specifically and culture more 
generally ‘not only reflects reality but also produces it.’10 Bond is no different. In 14 
Fleming books; 25 novels by other authors; 26 official and ‘unofficial’ films; plus 
countless references elsewhere in popular culture; Bond has played a vital role in 
3	
	
constructing the meaning of secret intelligence and framing the discourse used to 
understand it.  
This article has two objectives. On one level, it looks to answer the question 
of ‘why James Bond matters?’ In a provocative 1993 essay, Wesley Wark 
encouraged political scientists and political historians to address this question.11 
The years since have seen Bond become the subject of a number of serious 
academic books, articles and special journal editions. Indeed, there is even now a 
peer-reviewed online journal, The International Journal of James Bond Studies, hosted by 
the Department of English and Creative Writing at the University of 
Roehampton.12 To date, however, most of these newly engaged contributions on 
the subject have come from other disciplines, such as gender studies, postcolonial 
studies, cultural geography, as well as film, literary and cultural studies.13 James 
Chapman has undertaken by far the best work so far in the field of political science 
and political history with Licence to Thrill: A Cultural History of the James Bond Films. 
Using an intertextual approach sensitive to historical context, Chapman connects 
each film to world events plus the shifting sands of popular attitudes towards 
issues such as class, race, gender and imperial decline.14 Somewhat similarly, Jeremy 
Black’s The Politics of James Bond offers an account of the political content of 
Fleming’s novels and the films up to The World Is Not Enough (1999), focusing 
particularly on Bond’s engagement with Cold War geopolitics.15 From the 
disciplinary vantage point of Politics and International Studies, as well as the sub-
discipline of Intelligence Studies, we would like to extend Chapman’s and Black’s 
work by arguing that Bond is important because, rightly or wrongly, and not 
without inaccuracy, it has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence 
agencies and security threats. With intelligence services historically unable and 
unwilling to open up about their operations, we would argue that Bond – 
unclassified and accessible – has functioned as an important site through which the 
public has come to perceive intelligence, plus the threats faced by intelligence 
communities. This is not to say that ‘real’ intelligence is James Bond, any more 
than it is sensible to suggest that ‘real’ intelligence is John le Carré’s George Smiley 
or Robert Ludlum’s Jason Bourne. Rather, as Alexis Albion claimed, it is about 
recognising that in the public consciousness there is often an automatic association 
between the two. To paraphrase Albion, ‘Espionage is not James Bond’; but, for 
millions of people, in a world where knowledge about real intelligence is rationed, 
‘James Bond is espionage’.16  
On another level, this article explores the unexpected yet important 
interactions between Bond and the actual world of intelligence. There is an 
orthodoxy dictating that Bond and spying are diametric opposites: one is the stuff 
of fantasy, the other is reality, and never the twain shall meet. Publicly, intelligence 
services distance themselves from Bond. In October 1965, a few months after 
resigning as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John McCone 
wrote to The New York Times stating, ‘I was soon to learn that there existed not an 
assembly of mysterious James Bonds but rather an assembly of thoughtful men 
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and women whose purpose is to collect every scintilla of information on countries 
of interest to the United States’.17 In the twenty-first century, intelligence and 
security agencies remain committed to telling the public that Bond is nothing like 
‘real life’. On the FAQ page of its website, the CIA poses the question, ‘Are there 
secret agents like James Bond with secret gadgets?’ Their answer: CIA officers are 
‘not nearly as glamorous or thrilling’.18 On its homepage, Britain’s Security Service 
(MI5) asks a series of ‘true or false’ questions, one being ‘Films and TV give an 
accurate insight into the work of MI5?’ If someone clicks ‘true’, they will be 
informed that they are ‘incorrect’, since spy fiction is ‘entertaining but rarely 
realistic’.19  
In this article, we would like to suggest that the logic of ‘never the twain 
shall meet’ is problematic, for the worlds of Bond and real intelligence collide, 
overlap and intermesh in fascinating ways. Renowned espionage writer Nigel West 
hinted at this blending of spy fact and spy fiction in an important piece in this 
journal in 2004, but thus far his appeal for further investigation by scholars of 
intelligence has gone largely unanswered.20 In private, intelligence agencies have 
long taken a keen interest in Bond, belying their public pronouncements of the 
fictional spy as trivial and bearing no resemblance to ‘what really goes on’. It will 
be argued that intelligence services worry about the impact that Bond has on 
public understanding of their work, since perceptions can influence important 
matters like recruitment, funding, and morale. Moreover, it will be shown that 
certain services have even drawn inspiration from Bond – in a classic case of life 
imitating art – especially when it comes to gadgets and gizmos. In short, Bond is 
important for scholars because he is an international cultural icon that continues to 
operate at the borders of fiction and reality, framing and constructing not only 
public perceptions but also to some degree intelligence practices. 
 
 
I 
 
 
James Bond has had a major, if not disproportionate, influence on popular 
understandings of intelligence. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former executive director of 
the CIA, referred to this as the ‘James Bond syndrome’.21 For the sake of 
transparency and accountability in a healthy democracy, it would be wonderful if 
agencies could talk about what they do, in real time. But, of course, absolute 
openness is not possible. The success of ongoing and future operations, plus 
analysis, dictates that secrecy is essential, especially in regards to fragile sources and 
methods. Moreover, to entice agents and allies to work with them, agencies have to 
earn their trust – and this means maintaining a certain mystique about their 
activities. In the United Kingdom, the impulse for secrecy was so great that for 
most of the twentieth century the three main agencies were not even on the statute 
book, a situation that prevailed until legislation was introduced in 1989 and 1994 
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respectively.22 Parliamentary discussion about intelligence was forbidden, regarded 
as ungentlemanly and un-patriotic, whilst D-Notices and the draconian Official 
Secrets Act stymied reporting of intelligence matters in the press, historical writing, 
and official memoirs.23 The very name of SIS – Secret Intelligence Service – 
suggested the public must know nothing about it. Because of the secrecy employed 
by the authorities, therefore, popular culture has enjoyed a privileged position in 
terms of how the public has come to know about and conceptualise intelligence 
work. As the longest and most commercially successful spy franchise in history, 
Bond has arguably played the biggest role in shaping that understanding. Indeed, 
John le Carré once remarked that his biggest frustration as a ‘realist’ spy fiction 
writer was that the public instantly assumed that ‘Spy meant Bond’.24 
Intelligence professionals recognise Bond’s impact on popular attitudes, but 
disagree on whether 007 works to their advantage. Kirkpatrick’s opinion was that 
the ‘James Bond syndrome…hasn’t helped the CIA image’, because it gives the 
mistaken impression that intelligence is less about analysis and more about action 
and cloak-and-dagger escapades.25 In his memoir, ex-CIA Director William Colby 
suggested that one of the reasons people were so outraged in the mid-1970s by 
revelations of real dirty tricks and bumbling ineptitude by the Agency was because 
they had been led to believe – by ‘the scenarios in the James Bond films’ – that 
secret agents ‘were the derring-do boys…matching fire with fire in an endless 
round of thrilling adventures’.26 Similarly, ex-CIA Director Robert Gates has 
lamented that Bond creates unrealistic public expectations about what real 
intelligence agencies can achieve. In 007’s universe, the impeccably-attired hero 
goes to SIS headquarters where he receives orders from his boss, the old sea dog 
‘M’, and 90 minutes later is seen sipping a celebratory cocktail, girl in his arms, the 
enemy having been roundly defeated. Real life, of course, does not work like that: 
intelligence is usually a painstakingly slow business, where it takes months, even 
years, for threats to be identified, monitored and stopped, mostly without any 
public acknowledgment. ‘More than any other institution in America’, claimed 
Gates, in a lecture at Texas A&M University in November 1999, ‘I suspect that 
CIA…has been subject to mythology and misinformation. The result…of too 
many James Bond and Jack Ryan movies, and at least one too many movies 
directed by Oliver Stone’.27 
By contrast, there are intelligence professionals who regard Bond as a 
positive force. Anecdotal evidence suggests that British intelligence has profited 
from the cachet provided by Bond. Former SIS chief Sir Colin McColl has 
described the fictional spy as ‘the best recruiting sergeant in the world’.28 Another 
retired head of the service has claimed that, while rival intelligence agencies may 
have to entice agents with cash-filled envelopes, assets recruited by SIS would 
simply hear the English accent and ‘virtually stand to attention, such was the 
honour’.29 The same spy chief tells the story of when SIS first made contact with a 
tribal leader in an African state, he knew only three words: ‘Hello, Mr. Bond’.30 
Fleming, a personal assistant to the Director of British Naval Intelligence (DNI) 
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during the Second World War, had no doubt that Bond helped the real spooks. 
Writing to the Foreign Office in 1959, he said with pride: ‘I have taken pains to see 
that they [the books] would not cause offence to my old friends in the Intelligence 
world. I also know from senior members of that world that, far from causing 
offence, the adventures are followed with affectionate interest tinged with hilarity 
by members of “The Firm”.’31  
Perhaps surprisingly, owing to his reputation as a notoriously traditional and 
discreet civil servant (hence the epithet ‘the man who kept the secrets’),32 CIA 
Director Richard Helms welcomed the impact that Bond had on the public 
imagination since the hero exemplified the unassuming belief of CIA officers in 
the importance of their work, and the ability of the individual to make a 
difference.33 Interestingly, according to his widow Cynthia, Helms despised le 
Carré and worried about the negative effect the cerebral spy-chronicler had on 
public perceptions.34 While le Carré’s gritty spy fiction was perhaps more accurate 
and believable than Bond at the literal level, philosophically it was not a 
representation that Helms found palatable.35 The suggestion that East and West 
were equally corrupt and violent – two sides of the same dirty coin – was anathema 
to him. 
In an article for an Italian magazine in 1966, journalist Lietta Tornabuoni 
gave a powerful illustration of how Bond impacted perceptions of intelligence.36 
Tornabuoni had invited her readers to send her questions they would ask a real life 
Italian secret agent. She received thousands of letters, with the most popular 
questions being: did you have to be a bachelor; did the job come with a fast car; 
what if I have a fear of flying; and ‘If I entered the secret service, how many people 
exactly would I have to kill in a year?’37 Clearly, her readers had been influenced by 
fiction. The things they associated with the life of a spy – independence, 
excitement, travel, violence, and a licence to kill – were synonymous with Bond.38 
What is important here is not whether Italian intelligence was like Bond. Rather, 
what is important is that people made a connection between the two and imagined 
that it must be.  
Intelligence agencies are mindful – and increasingly so – of the connections 
people make between what they see or read in fiction and what they imagine actual 
secret intelligence to entail. Popular culture, they recognise, is a powerful social 
force. Declassified documents reveal that, during the 1960s, both the CIA and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) kept files on Bond, consisting largely of 
newspaper cuttings, to monitor the possible effect of the fictional spy on their 
public image.39 Contained in one FBI file is a memo, dated 1 January 1964, written 
by Cartha DeLoach, a trusted adviser to Director J. Edgar Hoover, noting that 
Fleming’s novels ‘are generally filled with beautiful women presenting themselves 
in scantily attire’.40 Another memo explained that since ‘Fleming’s stories generally 
center around sex and bizarre situations…[they are] not the type where we would 
want any mention of the FBI or portrayal of FBI agents’.41 Hoover evidently 
agreed, scribbling at the bottom of the document ‘I concur’. Behind the Iron 
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Curtain, illegal copies of the novels flourished, despite the censor’s tight grip. The 
KGB became so paranoid that good communist citizens would abandon the 
socialist project and embrace 007’s decadent and depraved bourgeois ideology, that 
in response they sponsored Bulgarian writer, Andrei Gulyashki, to pen an anti-
Bond novel in an attempt to win Cold War hearts and minds. First published in 
1966, Avakum Zakhov vs 07 depicts Bond as little more than a thug in a dinner suit, 
his secret agency no match for the brainpower of his communist rival, a PhD in 
archaeology.42  
Emulating their old KGB opponents, Western intelligence agencies are 
today more ambitious in how they think about fiction, going beyond simply 
archiving press clippings. Since the mid-1990s, the CIA has employed an 
Entertainment Liaison Officer to advise filmmakers in a bid to generate more 
realistic – and more positive – cinematic representations of the Agency.43 It has 
collaborated on several high-profile films, including Zero Dark Thirty (2012), the 
dramatization of the nearly-decade long international manhunt for Osama bin 
Laden, and Ben Affleck’s Oscar-winning Argo (2012), the story of how CIA 
exfiltration expert Tony Mendez rescued 6 US diplomats from Iran during the 
1979-1981 Hostage Crisis by flying them out of the country disguised as a 
Canadian film crew. The adage – ‘an intelligence success revealed is an intelligence 
failure’ – is breaking down as agencies recognise that a bad image is bad for 
business. Securing public trust is essential: without it, they will struggle to recruit 
the most talented people or obtain the necessary resources from appropriators. 
Moreover, poor perceptions undermine the self-worth of intelligence officers, 
which can damage efficiency and cause doubt in the mission. CIA Director George 
H.W. Bush once told a packed auditorium at Langley not to watch Three Days of the 
Condor (1975), starring Robert Redford and Faye Dunaway, because it ‘lay at the 
CIA’s doorstep all kinds of outrageous things that the CIA by its severest critics 
has never been accused of’.44 Ex-interim CIA Director John McLaughlin has 
written that since perceptions of intelligence work ‘depend to a large extent on 
what [people] see in cinematic, documentary and novelistic sources’, agencies have 
to take fiction seriously.45     
 
 
II 
 
 
Most analyses of the political content or impact of novels and films focus on how 
they can be read in the context of when they were made or released. What can they 
tell us about the concerns and trends of the time they were produced, and what 
messages about their subjects were their makers trying to project to their 
audiences? There is, however, another more temporally long-term element 
involved in reading the political facets in film. Due to their repeated screenings on 
television, plus widespread distribution on video, then DVD, and now via 
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downloads and streaming, films have acquired a life that makes them so much 
more than a marker of attitude at a particular moment in time. They become 
temporally detached from their original release, seen again and again in different 
contexts by their original audiences, or viewed for the first time by new viewers 
perhaps decades after they were made.  
For films, this means that readings of them and their significance are bound 
to change over time as tastes shift, attitudes adapt to evolving standards, and also 
technological developments both in filmmaking and in society more generally can 
make older films look rather quaint or outdated. For a series like Bond, these 
processes have still deeper effects. Aficionados will watch each film as it is 
released, bringing some understanding of the contemporary context to the viewing 
but also carrying with them certain expectations and meanings from previous 
entries in the series. They will interpret each film, perhaps quite critically, in 
relation to the earlier films. New or occasional viewers of the series are likely to 
experience the films differently – they may see them for the first time many years 
after their initial release with little understanding of the context within which they 
were made. They may see the films out of sequence or skip episodes. They may 
only see some of the films but frequently. Or they may begin watching the films at 
a particular juncture, perhaps when a new actor takes the lead role or a new story 
arc begins. In the case of Bond, that means that viewers may only have seen the 
Daniel Craig films and never sought out the earlier iterations. It may be that older 
viewers gave up on Bond after Sean Connery. It could also be that some readers of 
the novels disregard the films – or those that have delved into the books, have 
done so sporadically and again without knowledge of, or concern for, their 
contexts or chronology. They may not know Fleming’s novels at all but have been 
introduced to 007 through Charlie Higson’s ‘Young Bond’ adventures, or the other 
literary interpretations in the years since Fleming’s death.  
All these permutations need to be acknowledged when considering the 
public’s understanding of intelligence as received through Bond. There will be 
readers of the novels for whom they have offered a guide to what intelligence is 
about for over 60 years; there are others for whom the Connery films are their key 
source material; while others will perhaps know nothing about intelligence other 
than what they might have gleaned from the Craig era. Then there is the broader 
Bond phenomenon that reaches into music, television, other films, other novels, 
merchandising, advertising, and journalism, and indeed every day language where 
events, gadgets and individuals are often said to look or act ‘like something out of 
James Bond’. This abundance of material, and the different ways that different 
audiences access, interpret and engage with it, creates problems for any analysis of 
Bond’s significance. Most existing studies either give a chronological assessment of 
the novels and films or generate themes that can be addressed across time. In 
terms of what Bond can tell us about intelligence it is necessary to do two things – 
to consider the meanings attached to the books and films that are contextually and 
temporally significant for the time of release, but then also to look at how the 
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novels and films convey meanings about intelligence to audiences whether they 
encounter a Bond product at its time of release or many years later.  
Popular films help to frame public discourse on the subjects they address 
and are co-constitutive of public perceptions with those officials who perform the 
political institutionally. Building on Rosenstone’s scholarship, McCrisken and 
Pepper have argued that films, no matter how commercialised or seemingly 
apolitical and removed from ‘reality’ they may be, are useful sources for engaging 
with politics if they raise questions and challenge the audience to think about what 
they are seeing.46 While a lot of Bond output fits the high-octane action genre, with 
a heavy emphasis on spectacle over political content, it nonetheless raises 
important questions about intelligence, which, over the decades, have helped frame 
public discourse as well as the practices and representations of intelligence agencies 
themselves. In each Bond adventure, we would contend, there are five inter-related 
core questions:  
 
1) What is intelligence?  
2) How ethical is spying? 
3) How important is human intelligence (HUMINT)?  
4) How significant is British intelligence relative to other nation’s services, 
especially the United States?  
5) What are the security threats facing contemporary society?  
 
The importance of the franchise lies in its ability to pose these questions about 
intelligence consistently over time, and offer perspectives on them, to millions of 
people across the globe who rarely glimpse the inner workings of ‘real’ intelligence 
agencies. 
If Bond had a mission statement it would be this:  
 
[I] work secretly overseas, developing foreign contacts and gathering 
intelligence that helps to make the UK safer and more prosperous. [I] help 
the UK identify and exploit opportunities as well as navigate risks to our 
national security, military effectiveness and economy. [I] work across the 
globe to counter terrorism, resolve international conflict and prevent the 
spread of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons. [I] help protect the 
UK’s people, economy and interests. 
 
Replace ‘I’ with ‘We’ and this is actually the official mission statement of SIS, 
stated publicly on their website.47 It is telling how close 007’s objectives appear to 
be to the current self-view of SIS’s purpose. There are clear messages that run 
throughout much of Bond that reflect or project the concerns of contemporary 
intelligence agencies: the threats we face are existential in nature; intelligence is 
essential to the foiling of plots that threaten our safety and prosperity; UK agencies 
must work together to advance mutual interests; the role of the individual is 
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crucial; lethal force is a necessary part of counterterrorism, resolving international 
conflicts, and preventing the spread of nuclear and other highly destructive 
unconventional weaponry. These are all positions that can be problematized and 
challenged by scholars of security, but as the following analysis will show, the 
Bond series suggests to its audiences that these are normalised aspects of 
intelligence work that should not only be accepted as legitimate and necessary, but 
even celebrated as heroic. 
Many of the Bond storylines are spectacular or even fantastical. Master 
criminals hold the superpowers to hostage; megalomaniacs seek to control the 
world or destroy it; rogue agents seek to avenge their former bosses or take the 
fight to the enemy in ways their own governments deem unacceptable. There is a 
largely formulaic approach to both the novels and the films, with story arcs 
developing and resolving in similar ways, involving various binary relationships 
between Bond and M, Bond and the villain, and Bond and a woman, following 
mostly predictable patterns.48 It is through these formulaic elements, however, that 
the franchise delivers its main messages in answer to the question of ‘what is 
intelligence?’ 
One of the best-known, and much parodied, elements throughout the series 
is the self-defeating egotism of the villains. Bond’s opponents inevitably capture 
him, place him in mortal danger, and then, in a fit of hubris, reveal their entire evil 
plot to him, only for Bond to escape and frustrate their plans while sealing their 
own doom. This repetitive narrative device has become a mainstay of the series – 
we come to expect the moment when the villain, believing their own invincibility 
and underestimating Bond’s, reveals themselves and their plot. What this has 
suggested over the decades to audiences is that intelligence, espionage, and 
infiltration, are worthwhile, indeed crucial, tools in the defence not only of national 
security but also in the avoidance of catastrophe on a global scale. Such a narrative 
suited the Cold War perfectly but also has resonance for audiences today who 
since ‘9/11’ have been told by their political leaders that terrorism poses an 
existential threat to their societies. Indeed, as Jeremy Black argues, even Fleming’s 
‘novels were primarily tales of anti-terrorism…rather than novels about espionage 
in the sense of collecting or disseminating information.’49 Fleming introduced 
SPECTRE – Special Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terrorism, Revenge and 
Extortion – as Bond’s main opponents in his 1961 novel Thunderball, eight years 
before the widely agreed point at which modern terrorism was born with the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s hijacking of an Israeli airliner on 
July 22, 1968.50 
Another key message is that British intelligence is professional, morally 
upright, and globally significant. The films offered a cultural reassertion of the 
influence of Britain even as its geopolitical power waned with the ending of empire 
and the sometimes painful processes of decolonisation. Alongside other popular 
cultural phenomena such as The Beatles and Mary Quant’s mini-skirt, the Bond 
films were at the core of a swathe of cultural outputs that suggested Britain’s 
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creative skills were at the forefront of modernity and progression. It was important 
to Fleming, and to the filmmakers, that Bond be seen as a professional and well-
trained individual, directed by an extremely reputable service. There is far less in 
Bond of the moral ambiguity or deceit that runs through the works of le Carré.51 In 
the novels especially, Bond is portrayed as an accomplished assassin. For all the 
frivolity in the films, the underlying narrative is of the consummate professional 
rather than a devil-may-care chancer or brutal, shoot-first-ask-questions-later, killer 
of so many imitators. Despite the licence to kill and its normalisation of 
assassination in the name of Queen and Country, the British Secret Service is 
portrayed as a positive force and through the conviction of M, there is more often 
than not no quarter offered to ambiguity about the necessity and legitimacy of 
Bond’s missions, and the lethal force he is licenced to use. In the novels, and as 
played in the films by Bernard Lee, Robert Brown, Judi Dench, and Ralph Fiennes, 
M is always there as the voice of authority and reason. Bond can be reckless, even 
rebellious, but ultimately his actions fall under the control, guidance and 
legitimisation of M as the Head of Her Majesty’s Service, even when rogue internal 
elements try to undermine that legitimacy and authority as they do in the most 
recent films.  
Bond will do whatever it takes protect Britain, the US, and indeed the world. 
At times this can mean, as Sunday Express critic Thomas Wiseman complained in 
1962, that 007 is ‘a man whose methods and morals are indistinguishable from 
those of the villains.’52 In the opening of Dr. No, station chief Strangways and his 
secretary Mary Trueblood are both murdered. In both the novel and film, the 
shooting of the unarmed secretary is brutal, designed to shock and arouse the 
emotions of the audience: ‘Trueblood opened her mouth to scream. The man 
smiled broadly. Slowly, lovingly, he lifted the gun and shot her three times in and 
around the left breast. The girl slumped sideways off her chair’.53 From the outset, 
the message is that the enemy in a Bond adventure is serious and deadly, willing to 
use lethal force without hesitation, even against an unarmed woman. Yet later in 
the film, Bond is seen to be just as callous when he kills Professor Dent, a 
geologist and ally of Dr No. Dent is ordered to kill Bond and unloads his gun into 
a decoy of pillows in Bond’s bed. 007 reveals himself waiting in a chair, gun drawn. 
After a brief conversation, Dent recovers his weapon from the rug and shoots 
again at Bond, but he is out of ammunition. Bond casually observes ‘That’s a Smith 
and Wesson, and you’ve had your six’, then calmly shoots him, rather than 
capturing him, even though he is unarmed. Bond then shoots Dent a second time 
to finish him off, this time in the back after he has fallen to the floor, apparently 
dead already. The scene was controversial, according to director Terence Young, 
but less so than Bond’s apparent use of SPECTRE agent Fiona Volpe as a human 
shield in the film of Thunderball, spinning her swiftly around as they dance so that a 
would-be assassin’s bullet flies mortally into her back rather than his. Although 
Bond laughs it off with a tasteless quip, the scene and many others in the series 
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demonstrate that 007 is prepared to kill in cold blood to protect himself, his allies, 
and ultimately his mission.  
Daniel Craig’s Bond has heralded a return to the cold and clinical assassin of 
the books and early films. In the opening to 2006’s Casino Royale, he earns his ‘00’ 
licence with the requisite two-kills. The first in a bloody hand-to-hand fight in a 
men’s restroom that ends with Bond apparently drowning his assailant in a hand 
basin before having to finish him off with a single shot as the barely recovered 
target desperately aims his pistol; the second is a crooked SIS station chief, 
Dryden. Bond is seen waiting for him in his Prague office. With echoes of the 
killing of Dent in Dr No, there is a brief conversation establishing that Bond is yet 
to earn ‘00’ status before Dryden pulls his gun from his desk and attempts to shoot 
Bond, only for Bond to reveal that he has removed Dryden’s ammunition clip. 
Bond calmly dispatches the now defenceless traitor with a single, lethal shot. 
Before this, Dryden mocks Bond for how his first kill has affected him:  
 
DRYDEN 
Made you feel it did he? 
(sees the truth in  
Bond’s eyes) 
Well, no worries, the second is-- 
 
  Bond raises his silenced Walther and fires, cutting off 
  the words before they reach Dryden’s lips. 
 
BOND 
Yes. Considerably.54 
 
The viewer is left with no doubt that Bond will use whatever force is necessary, 
even if it amounts effectively to carrying out summary executions on behalf of the 
state. In Bond, the message is clear: keeping Britain safe sometimes requires the 
use of lethal force, even if there may be ethical questions over the way that force is 
used.  
Far from being fantasy, such sentiments are central to contemporary 
counter-terrorism in Britain. For example, as Prime Minister David Cameron told 
the House of Commons in September 2015 after an RAF drone strike had killed 
two British citizens in Syria who were allegedly members of so-called Islamic State 
(ISIL):  
If there is a direct threat to the British people and we are able to stop it by 
taking immediate action, then, as Prime Minister, I will always be prepared 
to take that action.…We should be under no illusion; their intention was the 
murder of British citizens, so on this occasion we ourselves took action.55 
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Such an approach to counterterrorism is now commonplace and normalised, not 
only in UK but also in US policy.56 This normalisation of violence on behalf of 
Her Majesty’s Government is central to the character of Bond since it is his licence 
to kill that defines his purpose as a secret agent. In delivering this message over 
and over to audiences, he plays a key role in creating acceptance that the work of 
secret intelligence should legitimately and almost unquestioningly include the lethal 
use of force. 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
The relationship between SIS and other intelligence services, particularly the CIA, 
is central to many of the Bond stories and constitutes another major facet in their 
significance in answering the question of ‘what is intelligence?’ Cooperation 
between services is portrayed as essential – whether it is with René Mathis of the 
French DGSE in Casino Royale, Tiger Tanaka of Japanese intelligence in You Only 
Live Twice, or Wai Lin of the Chinese People’s External Security Force in Tomorrow 
Never Dies. Long before the Cold War drew to an end, Bond also found himself 
collaborating with his purported enemies in the KGB, not least in the form of 
recurring character General Gogol who worked tirelessly in several films to try to 
keep a balance between east and west so as to prevent the Cold War turning hot. 
In The Spy Who Loved Me (1977), the fictional head of the KGB announces, 
somewhat prematurely given the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two years later, 
that: ‘We have entered a new era of Anglo-Soviet cooperation’. Bond not only 
works alongside Soviet intelligence officer Anya Amasova as an equal in the film, 
but the plot sees Bond commanding British, American and Soviet forces together 
against the common foe of Stromberg in what James Chapman describes as an 
‘allegory of the international alliance of the Second World War’.57 Here and 
elsewhere in the series, the view is promoted that liaison can bring more effective 
outcomes than being driven blindly by ideology. Of all the cooperative 
relationships, however, the most important is with the CIA as personified by 
Bond’s closest recurring associate (other than M, Moneypenny, and Q) in Felix 
Leiter. 
Leiter appears in six of Fleming’s books and ten of the films (if Never Say 
Never Again, the 1983 non-Eon Productions remake of Thunderball, is included). 
Bond has great affection for his American counterpart, perhaps mirroring the 
friendship that Fleming himself developed with CIA Director Dulles (of which 
more later), with his character being utilised to demonstrate the so-called Anglo-
American ‘special relationship’ and its importance for both sides. As Kingsley 
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Amis observed, however, Fleming was not willing to accept that the US had 
supplanted its former colonial master as the preeminent global power:  
 
 The point of Felix Leiter…is that he, the American, takes orders from 
 Bond, the Britisher, and that Bond is constantly doing better than he, 
 showing himself, not braver or more devoted, but smarter, wittier, tougher, 
 more resourceful, the incarnation of little Old England with her quiet ways 
 and shoe-string budget wiping the eye of great big global-tentacled multi-
 billion-dollar-appropriating America.58 
 
As Chapman argues, Leiter’s relationship with Bond offers a ‘quaint reversal of the 
real balance of power’ between London and Washington in what is perhaps the 
core of Fleming’s ‘ideological project’ to ‘redress the decline of British power’’.59 
At various points in the series, Leiter operates as a ‘sidekick’ to Bond, and 
collaboration with the American is often essential – not least when Leiter bails out 
Bond in Casino Royale, in both the 1953 novel and 2006 film, when he has lost 
millions to Le Chiffre playing cards.60 Nonetheless, the underlying subtext, even 
when Bond relies on American firepower to assist him in films like Thunderball and 
Moonraker, is that while the US may have great military strength, it is Bond’s 
ingenuity and class that will prove the ultimate difference in defeating threats to 
Western security.   
The relative decline of US power in global affairs has exercised a range of 
scholars since at least the 1970s, and this debate is reflected in the films. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s films, the Americans are portrayed as less reliable and 
effective, as the debacle in Vietnam demonstrated their real-life impotency. 
Moreover, the CIA plays a gradually less prominent role before disappearing 
altogether, a reflection of the Agency’s real-life woes during this period when many 
of its dirty tricks were unearthed. As the CIA’s first film industry liaison officer 
Chase Brandon contends: ‘In the early movies, he [Leiter] was portrayed with 
respect and fundamental trade-practice correctness. As the Bond films drifted into 
caricature in the 70’s, so did Leiter. I didn’t like that, and I don’t think anyone 
around here did either.’61 Indeed, when Leiter returned, in 1989’s Licence to Kill, it 
was as a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officer. The film reproduces a scene 
from the novel Live and Let Die, where Leiter barely survives being fed to a shark, 
losing a hand and a leg. In the film, Bond goes on a personal vendetta, against the 
express orders of M, to avenge his American friend whose newly-wed wife has also 
been brutally murdered. The film’s significance in terms of the US-UK relationship 
is open to a complex reading. The relative weakness of the Americans is reflected 
not only in the maiming of Leiter himself, but also in the need for Bond to become 
a rogue agent in order to more effectively prosecute what is essentially the US war 
on drugs.  
By the time Leiter again featured in an official Bond film, in Casino Royale, it 
was seventeen years later returning as a CIA agent and reinvented as an African 
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American (as he had been earlier in the unofficial Never Say Never Again), 
reinvigorated with all limbs intact. His position relative to Bond is also re-
established, playing the supportive role he does in Fleming’s original novel by 
providing the losing Bond with a stake of $5 million (32 million francs in the book) 
because he believes the British agent has the skill to defeat Le Chiffre in their card 
game while he does not. The American is the moneyman (‘Does it look like we 
need the money?’ Leiter quips), but it is the Briton who sits at the centre of the 
film as hero, with only Bond able to deploy the resources offered by Leiter to best 
effect.  
In the sequel, Quantum of Solace (2008), Leiter is in a more ambiguous 
position under the command of the brash but blinkered CIA Section Chief in 
South America, Gregg Bream. The US is allying itself to entrepreneur Dominic 
Greene, who Bond reveals to be a member of the mysterious Quantum 
organisation, to secure oil interests for the US in Bolivia. In a frank discussion with 
Leiter, Bond issues stinging criticism of US policy and its intelligence services: 
‘that’s what I like about US Intelligence, you’ll lie down with anybody.…Do you 
know you’re being played?’ Leiter knows that his smart British friend is right and 
assists Bond, building his personal loyalty in opposition to his naïve section chief. 
Throughout the film, it is British intelligence that is the most professional service, 
with the best understanding of how the villain’s scheme is unfolding, and the 
strongest moral compass, while Bream represents the worst of ‘ugly’ hubristic 
Americanism. Released in 2008, the film’s critique of US foreign policy seems to 
point a critical finger toward George W. Bush’s Middle Eastern adventures. 
Perhaps in a nod to the changing of the political order that was about to happen in 
the US after two terms of Bush, it is revealed by M at the end that Leiter has been 
promoted over Bream, much to Bond’s approval: ‘Well then the right people kept 
their jobs.’ 
Prime Minister Tony Blair was, of course, a willing accomplice in Bush’s 
‘war on terror’, utilising ‘dodgy’ intelligence that supported his preferred course of 
action to deal with the supposed threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In 
Quantum, there is a key scene when M goes to the UK Foreign Secretary to 
convince him of the threat posed by Quantum. In a not so subtle critique of Blair’s 
approach to intelligence five years earlier, the Minister chastises M: ‘Foreign policy 
cannot be conducted on the basis of hunches and innuendo’. M calmly responds: 
‘Then give us time to gather enough evidence so you can make informed 
decisions.’ It is a clear example of a common theme in the Craig films – the 
rehabilitation of British intelligence in the wake of the Iraq War. The strong 
message here and elsewhere in the rebooted series is that politicians need to treat 
intelligence agencies with the seriousness and respect that the filmmakers believe 
they deserve. 
Long a central feature of Bond is the fundamental necessity of HUMINT. 
Bond foils plots by gathering and acting upon vital human intelligence. His 
missions usually involve making contact with other agents or assets in the field to 
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determine the nature of the threat and to get closer to its source. His methods 
often require deception and infiltration. A familiar device is Bond’s ability to turn a 
member of the villain’s organisation, usually a woman through his powers of 
seduction. Lisa Funnell has described Bond’s skill at ‘turning’ a female enemy, 
through haptic intervention, as ‘ideological repositioning’.62 Typically, the villain 
discovers these betrayals, leading to a range of grisly deaths including informants 
being fed to piranhas and torn apart by dogs. Bond rarely mourns these assets – 
they serve their purpose and when they are gone he moves on, though often with a 
deepened determination to defeat the villain. Bond often end ups fighting the 
villain with the assistance of an ally, but ultimately it is he alone who wins the day, 
bringing his unique skills to bear on the intelligence that he acquires. Bond 
emphasises what Jeremy Black calls ‘the capacity of the individual to affect, indeed 
effect, a solution in the world of great power politics.’63 Bond does so in a time 
when technology appears to be transforming all our lives, potentially making the 
individual and the role of human intelligence far less relevant as the world becomes 
increasingly mechanised and computerised. Gadgets have been a mainstay of Bond 
through Q-Branch, but rather than Bond becoming reliant on these technical 
innovations they serve instead as ‘an enabler for Bond’s potency’ and the films 
actually celebrate ‘the supremacy of the individual and his qualities over technology 
and mechanization.’64 
The importance of HUMINT lies at the centre of the 50th anniversary film 
Skyfall (2012). At the mid-way point, M finds herself before a Parliamentary 
hearing, defending the intelligence services and arguing for their future. The 
haughty Minister chairing the session berates M for her ‘old fashioned’ beliefs: ‘It’s 
as if you insist on pretending we still live in a golden age of espionage where 
human intelligence was the only resource available’. M’s response, given moments 
before former agent Raoul Silva shoots his way into the building, is an eloquent 
defence not only of the intelligence services but also human intelligence itself. It 
ranks as one of the most pivotal and reflective speeches to be delivered in a Bond 
film: 
 
Today I’ve repeatedly heard how irrelevant my department has become. 
Why do we need agents? The double-O section? Isn’t it all rather quaint? 
Well, I suppose I see a different world than you do. And the truth is that 
what I see frightens me. I’m frightened because our enemies are no longer 
known to us. They do not exist on a map. They’re not nations, they are 
individuals. And look around you - who do you fear? Can you see a face, a 
uniform, a flag? No. Our world is not more transparent now, it’s more 
opaque. It’s in the shadows – that’s where we must do battle. So, before you 
declare us irrelevant, ask yourselves – how safe do you feel? 
 
Judi Dench, as M, looks straight into the camera, straight into the eyes of the film’s 
audience, as she delivers the last five words. It is the most explicit advocacy of 
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human intelligence anywhere in the Bond series, and the whole film serves as a 
reminder to its audiences that the intelligence services and HUMINT are not 
anachronistic remnants of the Cold War but an absolute necessity in facing down 
21st century threats.  
The Craig films also explore the idea that technological advances might have 
rendered HUMINT passé. Q warns Bond in Skyfall: ‘I’ll hazard I can do more 
damage on my laptop, sitting in my pyjamas, before my first cup of Earl Grey than 
you can do in a year in the field.’ In Spectre (2015), the theory is tested by Max 
Denbigh, head of a newly formed Centre for National Security, who establishes a 
global surveillance network linking together the digital and signals intelligence 
capabilities of nine major powers. His vision for the future of intelligence is one of 
computer desk-jockeys, crunching data and operating drones with joysticks. We are 
told he ‘wrote a dossier last year on how the Double-O programme was obsolete, 
how drones could do all our dirty work abroad.’ This vision, however, is flawed. 
The villain of the film, a rebooted Ernst Blofeld, is defeated by Bond’s HUMINT, 
not a super-computer. Moreover, Denbigh is himself unmasked as a traitor, in 
league with Blofeld, thanks to Bond’s expertise in the field. The film ends 
ambiguously with 007 throwing his gun from Westminster Bridge, hinting that this 
could be Craig’s final outing in the role, or even that the franchise might be 
wound-up. Minutes later, at the conclusion of the credits, audience members are 
nevertheless reassured that ‘James Bond Will Return.’ As Q had explained in 
Skyfall when Bond himself had questioned why he was still needed – ‘Every now 
and then a trigger has to be pulled.’ 
 
 
IV 
 
 
The popularity of 007 has enabled the ‘imagined’ world of Bond to become a 
major influence on perceptions of the ‘real’ world of intelligence. However, 
without the veracity of Fleming’s own experiences as a Naval Intelligence officer 
during World War II and his connections to members of the intelligence services 
in the UK and US afterwards, it would have been a poorer creation and would not 
have achieved the same level of cultural resonance it has acquired. While it was 
inevitable that Fleming’s intelligence experiences would inform his fictional 
creation, it was less so that practitioners in the British and American intelligence 
services would also be influenced by the fictional accounts of spying in his novels 
and later the films. It is clear from the evidence, however, that they were and in 
significant ways.  
Chief among those to be inspired by Fleming was none other than Allen 
Dulles, head of the CIA from 1953 to 1961. Socially and ideologically, the two men 
were natural bedfellows. Both were part of the Establishment in their respective 
countries. A Princeton alumnus and white shoe corporate lawyer, Dulles came 
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from a family of illustrious public servants. He was the grandson of one Secretary 
of State, John Watson Foster, and the nephew of another, Robert Hansing. His 
elder brother, John Foster, continued the tradition by serving as President 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State. The son of a Conservative Member of Parliament 
and the grandson of a merchant banker, Fleming was born into privilege and was 
schooled at Eton and Sandhurst, plus universities in Munich and Geneva. The 
similarities did not end there. Both were serial womanizers. To the anguish of his 
long-suffering wife Clover, Dulles had, according to his sister Eleanor, ‘at least a 
hundred’ affairs.65 Fleming’s bed hopping was legendary – his sexual appetite every 
bit as voracious as 007’s. Importantly, both men held the same Manichean 
worldview and were determined to defeat what they regarded as the scourge of 
international communism. As perfervid believers in the importance of this mission, 
they both felt that intelligence agencies should devote more of their energies to 
covert operations, intervening whenever and wherever they saw fit, and without 
scruples.  
Dulles loved Bond. He had a full hardback set of Fleming’s thrillers in his 
library, and even sent fellow Bond enthusiast President John F. Kennedy typed 
notes offering his analysis.66 To the dismay of more ‘serious’ spy novelists like le 
Carré, Dulles enthused about 007 publicly. For example, addressing the annual 
conference of the Bookseller’s Association in 1963, he declared that the CIA could 
do with half a dozen or so James Bonds.67 In his 1969 book Great Spy Stories from 
Fiction, he ranked From Russia with Love alongside such classics as The Riddle of the 
Sands by Erskine Childers and Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent.68 The celebrity 
endorsement of America’s premier spy chief did wonders for Fleming’s book sales. 
Delighted, Fleming privately thanked Dulles, his ‘organization and staff [for] 
always co-operating so willingly with James Bond’.69 
At CIA, as Dulles confessed, ‘some of the professionals working for 
me…never could quite understand this weakness of the boss’.70 Although the real 
trials and vicissitudes of global politics are reversed in Fleming’s universe – with 
CIA officer Leiter firmly at the beck and call of 007 – Dulles liked Bond because 
of the messages the series communicated to the public about espionage. Dashing 
playboys sticking it to the Soviets in tourist playgrounds was the image of the spy 
business that Dulles wanted the public to have in their minds. Through Bond, he 
hoped, people would understand that intelligence was absolutely necessary.71 So 
impressed was he with Fleming’s propagandising of the intelligence mission that 
when, in 1963, the author suggested that he might retire his most famous creation, 
Dulles pleaded with him not do so: ‘I hope you have not really destroyed our old 
friend and colleague James Bond’.72 To further promote Fleming’s vision of 
intelligence, and somewhat jealous of British spy fiction, he even asked covert 
operations specialist E. Howard Hunt, a gifted novelist in his youth, to come up 
with an American equivalent of 007. In the late 1960s – using the pseudonym 
David St. John – Hunt wrote a series of novels featuring the character Peter Ward. 
Unfortunately, Ward was a poor man’s Bond and the trashy thrillers flopped. 
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Moreover, by the early 1970s Hunt had lost interest, his mind preoccupied by the 
unfolding Watergate scandal, in which he was implicated as the ringleader of the 
infamous ‘Plumbers Unit’ that had carried out the ‘third-rate burglary’ of the 
Democratic National Committee HQ.  
Dulles was particularly fascinated with Q-Branch, the fictional research and 
development division that equipped Bond with life-saving gadgets in the novels 
and the films – from underwater jet packs to machine guns masquerading as 
bagpipes, cyanide cigarettes to Geiger counter watches. Interviewed by Life 
magazine in August 1964, he revealed that he instructed his engineers at CIA to try 
to replicate as many of these devices as they could. Dulles said that he had been 
keen to see invented the pocket size homing radio beacon which, in the film 
Goldfinger, Bond furtively slips into the boot of the villain’s Rolls Royce to track 
him down after their round of golf: ‘I put my people in CIA to work on this as a 
serious project, but they came up with the answer that it had too many bugs in it. 
The device really didn’t work very well when the enemy got into a crowded city’.73 
Scientists did manage to reproduce the iconic, spring-loaded, poisoned-tipped 
dagger shoe with which Rosa Klebb, posing as a hotel maid, tries to stab Bond in 
From Russia with Love. Sadly, it is unknown whether these lethal brogues were ever 
used in the field.  
Dulles was not the last spy chief who sought to emulate Bond’s gadget-
powered success. CIA Director Bill Casey tasked his technicians to invent the facial 
recognition software that the psychotic Max Zorin uses to ID Bond in A View to a 
Kill (1985). Robert Wallace, a retired Director of the CIA’s Technical Services 
Staff, has recollected that: ‘Whenever a new Bond movie was released, we always 
got calls asking, “Do you have one of those?” If I answered “no”, the next 
question was, “How long will it take you to make it?” Folks didn’t care about the 
laws of physics or that Q was an actor in a fictional series – his character and 
inventiveness pushed our imagination’.74 Most extraordinary, perhaps, is that KGB 
defector Oleg Gordievsky has claimed the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party watched each new Bond film in the hope of copying some 
ingenious bit of kit.75 
It was not only in the realm of technology that Dulles valued Fleming’s 
blue-sky thinking. There are hints that he also turned to Fleming for operational 
advice. The evidence is limited, with the smoking guns just out of reach, but 
nevertheless warrants discussion. On 13 March 1960, Fleming was invited to a 
dinner party at the Georgetown home of John F. Kennedy, then a presidential 
candidate. For the evening, the young Senator had assembled a distinguished guest 
list of in-the-know Washingtonians that included John Bross, a high-ranking CIA 
official, and Joseph Alsop, the syndicated newspaper columnist who was part of 
the Agency’s informal information economy, writing articles that championed US 
foreign policy and dished the dirt on the Soviets. With everyone sipping coffee and 
brandy, post-prandial conversation tackled the issue of how to unseat the newly 
ascendant Cuban rebel leader Fidel Castro, a socialist threat 90 miles from Florida 
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who threatened to undermine Camelot’s star power. With boyish enthusiasm, 
Kennedy asked ‘What would Bond do’? A great raconteur, Fleming shot from the 
hip, suggesting that killing Castro was not enough; he had to be humiliated in the 
eyes of his people. Cubans, he told JFK, valued three things: money, sex, and 
religion. Exploiting this, the CIA should drop counterfeit money over Havana, 
with notes saying ‘compliments of the United States’. Then, it should flood the 
country with pamphlets claiming that radioactivity, caused by atomic testing in the 
region, was attracted to men with beards and resulted in impotence. To protect 
their virility, the barbudos would be shamed out of their macho facial hair, thus 
severing a symbolic link to the revolution. Finally, the CIA should project a 
religious manifestation over the Havana skyline, ideally a crucifix, to imply divine 
opposition to the communist regime. Everyone, including the Presidential hopeful, 
burst into laughter.76 
The next morning, in a beguiling postscript to this story, Bross regaled 
Dulles with Fleming’s hare-brained ideas. Remarkably, Dulles thought them 
wonderful, since they resonated with plans already being developed by the 
Technical Services.77 As Bross recalls it, they tried to reach Fleming to invite him 
to Langley.78 However, he was already on a flight to Jamaica. Sadly, this is where 
the paper trail ends and it would clearly be unwise to infer from this evidence that 
the British novelist was the architect of JFK’s Cuba policy. However, it is tempting 
to speculate that Fleming did at least play some part in encouraging the CIA down 
the path of fantastical solutions to the Cuban threat. The campaign later waged by 
the CIA against Castro – Operation Mongoose – involved ludicrous stunts to 
discredit the Cuban leader that bore an uncanny resemblance to the author’s 
proposals, from cigars laced with LSD to cause disorientation during public 
speeches, to contaminated handkerchiefs that would destroy his beard and pubic 
hair. During the Church Committee hearings in the mid-1970s into CIA 
improprieties, one intelligence officer confirmed at the witness table that the 
Agency had seriously considered the ‘elimination by illumination’ idea, which 
would have involved a US submarine surfacing off Havana and firing starshells 
into the sky, to convince the natives that the Second Coming was at hand.79 The 
Soviets were certainly convinced that Fleming had seduced the CIA. In April 1962, 
Izvestia reported: ‘Fleming’s best friend is Allen Dulles…who even attempted (but 
unsuccessfully) to try methods recommended by Fleming in his books. American 
propagandists must be in a bad way if they have recourse to the help of an English 
retired spy turned mediocre writer’. 80  
Fleming certainly enjoyed a special acquaintance with Dulles. Appreciative 
of the spymaster’s gushing public statements about Bond, Fleming returned the 
favour by including flattering references to him and the CIA in his novels, which 
were welcomed by the Agency as it sought to rehabilitate its image after the Bay of 
Pigs fiasco in April 1961. In Thunderball (1961), ‘M’ gives Bond his orders to 
recover two missing atomic bombs and enthuses, ‘We’ve teamed up with the CIA 
to cover the world. Allen Dulles is putting every man he’s got onto it and so am 
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I’.81 In You Only Live Twice (1964), Dulles is referred to affectionately as the ‘old 
fox’.82 And, in The Man with the Golden Gun (1965), Fleming even marketed the 
spymaster’s new book, commenting that Bond recovers from his duel with 
Scaramanga by ‘sitting in his chair, a towel, around his waist, reading Allen Dulles’s 
The Craft of Intelligence’.83 Arguably, we might even think of the two men as a citation 
ring.  
 
V 
 
When the Bond film franchise celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2012, the platitudes 
were far and wide. All attested to the enduring popularity and influence of 007 on 
perceptions of spying not only in the UK and US but also globally. As this article 
has argued, core narratives of intelligence among not only the public but also 
policymakers and intelligence officers are imagined, sustained, deepened, produced 
and reproduced through and by Bond. The very words ‘Bond’, ‘James Bond’, and 
‘007’ have a cultural resonance that give deep meanings beyond the mere name or 
number of the fictitious secret agent, penetrating both the public sphere and secret 
intelligence communities. Bond and intelligence should be thought of as co-
constitutive; the series shapes representations and perceptions of intelligence, but it 
also performs a productive role, influencing the behaviours of intelligence agencies 
themselves. Dulles taking cues from 1960s Connery-era Bond films, which in turn 
encouraged the filmmakers to invent even more outlandish spy gizmos such as the 
white Lotus Esprit that transformed into a submarine for Roger Moore’s Bond in 
The Spy Who Loved Me, is a perfect example of what James Der Derian describes as 
a feedback loop wherein the ‘reel’ and the ‘real’ co-constitute one another.84 
For more than half a century, the Bond franchise has conveyed unclassified, 
public answers to five core questions about intelligence that we have explored in 
this article. To the fundamental question of ‘what is intelligence?’, Bond in all its 
forms articulates a consistent view that it is a profession crucial to national and 
international security, essential both to contain and overcome existential threats. 
While the skills required for successful intelligence activities are wide and varied, 
the role of the individual is central to its effectiveness. Moreover, there can be no 
qualms about the necessity and legitimacy of the use of lethal force. This latter 
point contributes to the second question of how ethical spying should be. Bond, 
and particularly his superior M, are portrayed as professionals who are expertly 
trained, disciplined and morally upright. While Bond may sometimes appear 
rebellious, he is always loyal to Queen and Country; moreover, he knows what 
lines can and cannot be crossed.   
Throughout the series, but particularly since the Craig era reboot, 007 
provides an unequivocal answer to a third question, namely ‘how important is 
human intelligence?’ On practically every mission, Bond’s success is rooted in the 
necessity of human assets and allies; the need to personally infiltrate and deceive 
enemy networks; the utility and power of individual skill over reliance on 
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technology; and ultimately the effectiveness of the use of lethal force by an agent 
who is licenced to kill. The fourth question addressed by Bond is how significant 
British intelligence is relative to other nation’s services. A clear message is that 
cooperation is often key to success, but that British intelligence remains not only 
significant after the demise of empire, but also uniquely able to contribute to global 
security. While other services, particularly US intelligence, might have superior 
access to resources and firepower, it is Bond’s greater class, skill and intellect, 
coupled with M’s voice of reason, that sets the British apart and ensures victory. 
The Bond novels and films represent a cultural reassertion of Britain’s significance 
globally. 
Finally, Bond has presented audiences with answers to a timeless fifth 
question; namely, what threatens contemporary society? The Bond franchise has 
been adept at keeping abreast of the perceived changes in security fears from the 
Cold War threat of nuclear annihilation through to so-called ‘new’ globalised 
security threats, many of which such as terrorism, bio-threats or transnational 
crime, Bond stories anticipated before they became commonplace on political or 
academic agendas. For millions of readers and film viewers, therefore, for better or 
worse, the ‘imagined’ world of Bond and the ‘real’ world of intelligence interact 
with each other in deeply significant ways. To understand how intelligence is 
perceived, and to a degree how it is constructed and narrativised, contrary to the 
reticent naysayers in the Ivory Tower, we avoid engaging with the ‘imagined’ realm 
of James Bond at our peril. 
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